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Abstract
A hot issue in trade negotiations concerns the existence of stateowned ﬁrms
and state subsidies. Disputes between the US and the EU and the issue of
the recognition of the status of a market economy to China are often the
epitome of that. In Germany the giant Volkswagen is state controlled, in
China almost 1/3 of ﬁrms are state controlled and loom in almost all indus-
tries often with relevant or even dominant market shares. State enterprises
maximize home social welfare. When they export or compete with foreign
producers at home their speciﬁc objective function make them a useful vehi-
cle for disguised trade policies. We investigate trade cases with oligopoly and
state or quasi state owned ﬁrms. Increasing returns to scale come into the
picture in some instances. Dumping and foreclosure of the domestic market
emerge explaining both the possibility of having home prices higher or lower
than export prices. Possible counteracting policies can be devised and an
example of a production subsidy is presented.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F12, F13, L32.
Keywords: Market asymmetry, dumping, market foreclosure, state owned
ﬁrms.
1 Introduction
After decades of gradual reductions of tariﬀs on trade it seems that tradi-
tional barriers have been to a large extent removed leaving quite low levels of
duties and other taxes on the international exchange of goods and services.
Unfortunately the apparent demise of traditional protection tools and the re-
duction of their weight in international exchanges does not imply that trade
barriers have been consigned to history. A large set of disguised, adminis-
trative, contingent and strategic obstacles remain in place. Moreover, new
protection tools have been devised by governments and, surprisingly enough,
by ﬁrms in many diﬀerent ways. In this sense the universe of enterprises
cannot be considered as a homogenoeus category. First of all ﬁrms show a
large variety of objectives according to their ownership and their internal
organization. Secondly their economic and environmental performances may
radically change according to the market in which they operate. Indeed "the
perception that trade policy is no longer relevant arises to a large extent
from the inability to precisely measure most non-tariﬀ barriers that have re-
placed traditional tariﬀs and subsidies as the primary tools of trade policy"
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2016). The deepening of economic and institutional
integration that has taken place since the establishment of the European Sin-
gle Market in 1993 had the goal of canceling or at least reducing radically
all non tariﬀ barriers that remained in place after the gradual cancellation
of traditional custom duties among EU member states. The EU Single Mar-
ket pioneering program had followers and imitators worldwide. For instance,
it inspired several actions carried out by the WTO since its birth in 1995
in its eﬀorts to tackle the surviving thick jungle of nontariﬀ restrictions to
trade. Nonetheless, it remains quite awkward to assess the extent of remain-
ing restrictions and uncover the underlying trade policies. Indeed this is
quite a complex task: the main tools of nowadays trade policy are not easily
quantiﬁable and their imprint not easily detectable. Some trade policies are
often embedded in ﬁrms’ strategies, making things more fuzzy. Others are
only indirectly traceable to government policy measures which do not con-
tain explicit reference to international trade. Further rules are hidden among
industrial policy interventions. "The challenges in the measurement of trade
policy raise the question of whether the world is truly liberalized, as many
believe, or if this impression is misguided and due to our inability to measure
the restrictions that really matter. "(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2016, p.5).
In this context of "nontransparent or hardly measurable" trade policies
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there arise a number of relevant concurrent economics issues related to the
presence of state owned ﬁrms in industries where ﬁrms engage in international
trade. How do state owned ﬁrms aﬀect international competitive outcomes?
How much are stateowned ﬁrms the perpetrators of disguised trade policies?
Incidentally this question is at the basis of the debate on the recognition to
China of the status of market economy (Puccio, 2015; Urdinez and Masiero,
2015). Large and sometimes dominant state owned ﬁrms operate in France,
Germany and other countries1. Here, regulators in many cases may require
public dominant ﬁrms to pursue domestic social welfare maximization. This
simple mode of behaviour may raise a few trade policy concerns. Do speciﬁc
rulings and public ﬁrms provide a trade advantage vis à vis countries where
the state presence in the economy is far less relevant? In the case of state
owned ﬁrms in Europe, China and elsewhere the majority of complaints raised
by foreign trade partners regard the presumed dumping policies associated
to Government subsidies or simply to "excessively aggressive" policies of
public ﬁrms. The defendants are noncompetitive practices based on selling
goods in foreign markets at prices which are too low partly with respect to
domestic prices, partly with respect to costs, but, above all, with respect
to foreign competitors.2 As a matter of fact, only the second case may be
entirely deﬁned as dumping, while the former is a kind of international price
discrimination and the third may be simply due to a cost advantage (Malueg
and Schwartz, 1994). For the sake of record, we have to say that many
competition authorities and trade regulators do not deem international price
discrimination a sound (and legitimate) ﬁrm strategy. Consequently they
tend to condemn it when it goes beyond a reasonable price diﬀerence across
countries. As a matter of fact there seems to be large room for discretionary
assessments and, at the end of the day the question of dumping and related
issues require further investigations and explanations. However, the main
group of questions is related to issues such as the recognition of the status of
market economy to China, the frequent trade disputes between the USA and
the UE and to stateowned ﬁrms. For instance in China state ﬁrms account
for about 1/4 - 1/3 of total production and for almost 40% of stock market
1In Germany regional public entities (Läender) have a control stake in the giant au-
tomaker Volkwagen and other ﬁrms. In France this is the case for Renault-Nissan. GM in
the Usa has beneﬁted from public capital injections. The dominant presence of public en-
terprises is quite relevant all over the globe, not just in Communist or formerly Communist
countries.
2See for instance: Zanardi, (2006) for questions related to dumping deﬁnition.
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capitalization. In France and Germany the weight of public (or semipublic)
ﬁrms is large but diﬃcult to precisely assess since many diﬀerent public
entities are involved. In all these cases the inﬂuence of government control
on ﬁrms strategies may be far broader than the sheer state ownership may
hint. Finally, there are numerous hybrid ﬁrms (where the state has only a
share of the equity) and this makes the issue more complex.
As literature (De Fraja and Delbono, 1990; Delbono and Rossini, 1992)
and observation suggest, state enterprises are strategically diﬀerent. They
pursue speciﬁc objectives which mirror the extent of government control.
The most common, yet not unique, assumption in the literature is that sta-
teowned ﬁrms maximize domestic social welfare rather than their own market
value. However, this objective gets blurred whenever a state ﬁrm extends its
operations abroad. How should be interpreted the objective of a state com-
pany when trade is considered? Obviously, it does not make sense to think
of a state owned ﬁrm maximizing the social welfare of the foreign countries
where it sells. Nor it seems reasonable to assume that a state owned ﬁrm
maximizes also the proﬁts of all foreign rival producers which sell on the do-
mestic market. Therefore, with trade it seems more realistic to take slightly
diﬀerent avenues. For instance, it may be assumed that state ﬁrms max-
imize domestic social welfare without including the proﬁt of foreign ﬁrms
exporting their goods to the country of the state owned ﬁrms. In addition to
that, when exporting the presumption is that state ﬁrms simply maximize
their operative proﬁt obtained from sales abroad without any concern for
the foreign social welfare. This assumption is close to the contribution of
Corneo and Jeanne (1994) where they consider the eﬀects of privatizations
on welfare and exports of a country where there are private and stateowned
ﬁrms. Their analysis, conﬁned to linear technology captures only countries
net trade positions and does not explore strategic issues leaving many open
questions as to the implications for trade and international competition of
the existence of state ﬁrms strategically exporting to foreign countries.
Our aim in the ensuing pages is to investigate a set of possible trade
strategies of state owned ﬁrms and to go deeper into the implications for
the degree of openness of a country. The purpose is to trace some kind of
disguised trade policies carried out by state owned ﬁrms. That may make a
country behave diﬀerently in international markets with respect to partners
where public ﬁrms are not so relevant and where they are not seen as a tool
for strategic trade policies. By the way these policies are not easy to detect
if the analysis is conducted with the lens of traditional trade protection.
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We shall see that state owned ﬁrms aﬀect the way we should think about
reciprocal trade between countries and, in particular, possible partial/total
foreclosure, (in)voluntary dumping and asymmetric beneﬁts of trade.
When a country is keen about domestic exporting ﬁrms we may ﬁgure
out state ﬁrms as maximizing an augmented social welfare function composed
by domestic social welfare plus the proﬁts from exporting. This looks like a
strongly domestically oriented perspective for a ﬁrm, yet not far from reality
of large ﬁrms under partial or total government control. As we shall see other
objectives may be used by state owned (or quasi state) ﬁrms to carry out
speciﬁc trade policies. A second, yet non secondary, point regards the advan-
tage a country (such as China, but the case could be made also for Germany
or the US) may have due to a large internal market. If a large market is
somewhat protected it may provide domestic ﬁrms "an exorbitant" compet-
itive advantage over rival countries. This advantage may be quite damaging
for small market oriented countries. What is the link with stateowned ﬁrms?
With increasing returns to scale we may ﬁgure out that the pricing policy
on the domestic market is somehow aﬀected by a regulator who imposes a
zero proﬁt condition. The rational ﬁrm choice in that case will be to charge
the entire ﬁxed cost on the domestic price, while selling abroad a quantity
corresponding to the equalization of marginal revenue and marginal cost.
In our analysis based on simple international oligopoly markets we shall
see that the strategies of state owned enterprises produce results which are
not always in favour of free trade. In certain circumstances, we end up with
some kind of dumping strategies. In other cases we obtain domestic market
partial (or complete) foreclosure. Indeed we shall see that a market covered
by a state ﬁrm tends to be foreclosed to foreign competition. As a result
trade opening has asymmetric eﬀects simply because of the prevalence in
one country of state enterprises or of ﬁrms behaving as if they were gov-
ernment controlled. A related question concerns the scenario in which ﬁrms
face increasing returns to scale. It appears that, if there are international
transport costs, the larger country has an advantage even though it does
not have any stateowned ﬁrm. Again there is no dumping, but the results
are quite asymmetric raising the question as to the need to introduce trade
policy measures to counteract a (seemingly natural) asymmetry damaging
smaller countries.
The concerns of many countries may not only be related to issues of
dumping and anti-dumping litigation (as underlined, inter alia, by Urdinez
and Masiero, 2015) but to the more subtle incidence of state owned ﬁrms and
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their market behaviour. Although strong conclusions should not be based on
an oversimpliﬁed model, the results of the paper can be productively linked to
the debate and some insights about the main concerns of the parties involved
be provided. To this purpose we shall also try to devise some counteracting
protection policy that could be adopted by a country where ﬁrms are all
privately run.
To make the case more real, in Appendix B we shall provide some anec-
dotal evidence based on four instances of goods produced in China and sold
everywhere in the world. We compare the retail prices at which those goods
are sold in China and in the European Union (EU). The four goods do not
aim to provide any signiﬁcant statistical basis to assess the pricing policies
of Chinese exporting ﬁrms but simply wish to represent examples of possible
behaviour of Chinese ﬁrms. As we can see, in two cases there is a presump-
tion that Chinese ﬁrms are carrying out a kind of dumping. The diﬀerence
between the price in China and in the EU is positive and so large that we
may classify it as dumping deﬁned as a substantial diﬀerence between the
domestic and the foreign price. In another instance the diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant excluding any dumping. In a fourth case the price diﬀerence is
reversed since the export price is signiﬁcantly higher than the domestic one.
We shall deﬁne this case as one of partial (or quasi) foreclosure since this
price gap may be become a barrier to enrty. Then, we have a wealth of
diﬀerent and somehow opposite results in search of an interpretation. Our
main goal is to see whether they may reveal any trace of possible disguised
trade policy carried out by ﬁrms on behalf of state objectives. Our goal is
not to pronounce any verdict neither on China nor on other countries where
stateowned ﬁrms are popular. We just wish to suggest cases of disguised
trade policies that may make a country less open to trade than it appears
and, ﬁnally, design some suggestive counteracting policies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we go through a simple
duopoly framework of the traditional Brander and Krugman (1983) type. In
section 3 we introduce country size asymmetries. In section 4 we go through
increasing returns to scale in international oligopolies. In section 5 we see
the eﬀects of product diﬀerentiation. In section 6 we extend the analysis to a
Bertrand framework with a state ﬁrm. Section 7 consider a possible example
of trade policy while section 8 draws some conclusions.
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2 An elementary duopoly framework
We start by considering an international duopoly made by two independent
enterprises, whose production is located in two distinct countries H (Home)
and F (Foreign) separated by transport costs represented by the iceberg
parameter t ∈ (0, 1[ (only a share t of the value produced in one country can
reach the foreign market)3. The ﬁrms manufacture a homogeneous good and
partially follow the Cournot tenet. Each ﬁrm faces two simple linear demand
functions4 in the two markets
pH = aH − qH − tqFX (1)
pF = aF − qF − tqHX
where pH and pF are the market prices of the good sold in market H and
F , aH and aF are the respective market size, qH , qF are the sales of the two
ﬁrms in their own countries while qHX , qFX are their exported outputs. The
proﬁt of the state owned ﬁrm based in country H is made by domestic plus
foreign proﬁt
πHS = πH + πHX
where
πH = pHqH and πHX = tpFqHX
since we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the production cost is null.
The consumer surplus in country H is
csH =
(aH − pH)(qH + tqFX)
2
while the proﬁt of the foreign private ﬁrm is:
πF = pF qF + tpHqFX .
Indeed, the ﬁrm based in H is state owned and maximizes the social welfare
of home. Then, social welfare does not include the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm
selling in H. Moreover, the state owned ﬁrm exports in the market of the rival
and sets its quantities by maximizing proﬁt on the foreign market. Unlike
3For a deﬁntion and an application see Rossini (2007).
4If we consider non linear concave demand fucntions we may end up with a market
which is partially foreclosed.
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the H ﬁrm, the foreign ﬁrm located in F is a private proﬁt seeking enterprise
and operates in both F and H markets by setting optimal Cournot quantities.
Let’s deﬁne home social welfare, maximized by H ﬁrm, as:
swH = csH + πH .
In this simple framework we can write the following:
Lemma 1 Two ﬁrms export to their rivals’ markets. One maximizes home
social welfare and proﬁt abroad. The foreign rival is a pure Cournot proﬁt
seeker. In equilibrium, the domestic market of the stateowned ﬁrm is fore-
closed to the foreign rival that does not export.
Proof. For the sake of simplicty we assume symmetric markets, i.e.,
aH = aF = a. We simultaneously solve for the following focs:
∂πF
∂qF
= 0 = a− 2qF − qHXt
∂πF
∂qFX
= 0 = t(a− qH − 2qFXt)
∂swH
∂qH
= 0 = a− qH
∂πHX
∂qHX
= 0 = t(a− qF − 2qHXt)

and get the equilibrium quantities:
q∗F =
a
3
; q∗FX = 0; q
∗
H = a; q
∗
HX =
a
3t
.
Socs are always met as the stability requirement over the sign of the principal
minor of the determinant of the Hessian matrix. Equilibrium social welfare
and consumer surplus are:
π∗F = π
∗
H =
a2
9
cs∗H =
a2
2
≥ cs∗F =
2a2
9
sw∗H =
a2
2
≥ sw∗F =
a2
3
.
If we include in sw∗H the proﬁt of the H ﬁrm in country F we get an aug-
mented version of domestic welfare, i.e., sw∗HN =
11a2
18
≥ sw∗H .
It can be easily veriﬁed that the two ﬁrms obtain the same proﬁt when
operating in country F, i.e., a
2
9
. Then, country H, possessing the stateowned
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ﬁrm, enjoys a higher consumer surplus (in country H the market price is
zero and equal to the marginal cost of the domestic ﬁrm) and the same
national producer surplus of the other country, since the H ﬁrm maximizes
proﬁt when operating abroad. Therefore, H enjoys a higher social welfare.
The interesting outcome is that in country H the market is foreclosed to the
foreign producer. The funny thing is that this occurs without any prohibitive
tariﬀ or discriminatory measure in favour of the domestic producer. In other
words we do not need any trade policy to keep the door of the domestic
market shut to foreign competitors. This is the ﬁrst example we provide of
a closed market in the absence of any trade policy.
If we compare this case with the control solution represented by a stan-
dard Cournot international duopoly with two symmetric proﬁt seeking ﬁrms,
we can write the following
Proposition 1 Let”s compare the asymmetric case containing a stateowned
ﬁrm in H with the standard symmetric Cournot case. The country with the
state owned ﬁrm enjoys a larger social welfare than in the symmetric Cournot
case, while the other country whose ﬁrm is foreclosed has a lower welfare. At
the global tier social welfare is higher with two proﬁt seeking Cournot ﬁrms.
Yet the global consumer surplus is higher even with the presence of just one
state owned ﬁrm which maximixes proﬁts abroad.
Proof. Let’s continue with the above framework. In the naive Cournot
symmetric case we have:
q∗F = q
∗
H =
a
3
; q∗HX = q
∗
FX =
a
3t
.
p∗H = p
∗
F =
a
3
Mind you that with the stateowned ﬁrm in H and the proﬁt seeking ﬁrm
in F the equilibrium market price in H is zero (p∗H = 0) while in contry F
is the same as in the case of the symmetric Cournot international duopoly
(p∗F =
a
3
).
π∗F = π
∗
H =
2a2
9
sw∗H = sw
∗
F =
4a2
9
cs∗H = cs
∗
F =
2a2
9
.
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Let’s compare the corresponding equilibrium welfare and consumer surplus
contained in the Lemma 1 proof. Simple inspection suggests that social
welfare turns out to be larger in symmetric Cournot for country F but lower
for country H with respect to the asymmetric case with a state owned ﬁrm
in country H. If we think globally we may see that
(cs∗H + cs
∗
F )SymmCournot − (cs
∗
H + cs
∗
F )AsymmStateFirm = −
5a2
18
.
while
(sw∗H + sw
∗
F )SymmCournot − (sw
∗
H + sw
∗
F )AsymmStateF irm = −
5a2
18
.
But if we use the broader version of social welfare in H in the case of the
state ﬁrm we have
(sw∗H + sw
∗
F )SymmCournot−(sw
∗
HN + sw
∗
F )AsymmStateF irm =
8a2
9
−
17a2
18
= −
1a2
18
which means that the global social welfare is higher with the state ﬁrm.
Foreclosure occurs also with product diﬀerentiation in the Cournot mode
of competition (see Appendix C) and is quite a general outcome. As we have
seen, this case leads to prices which diﬀer across countries. The country with
the state owned ﬁrm has its market foreclosed to foreign competitors and a
lower market price. In other words there is no dumping yet a limitation of
competition in the market of the country with the state owned ﬁrm. This
may have inﬂuential political economy implications which may make this
setting quite stable and sustainable in terms of domestic political consensus.
A simple corollary may be derived from the previous results just by con-
sidering the eﬀects of changes in country size. In the traditional Cournot
framework there is a positive eﬀect of increasing market size of a country on
the social welfare of the foreign partner. However, when in one country the
pretrade market is covered by a state ﬁrm this eﬀect disappears turning the
reciprocal beneﬁts of trade opening into quite asymmetric eﬀects. This can
be grasped in the following:
Corollary 1 As the size of the market of country H increases the social
welfare of country F does not change since the ﬁrm of country F is always
foreclosed, while in the traditional Brander-Krugman (1983) Cournot model
of trade the proﬁts of ﬁrm F grow (and hence swF ) when the partner country
gets larger.
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Proof. From the two previous proofs, simply assuming that the demand
in country H is
pH = aH − qH − tqFX
pF = aF − qF − tqHX
we can see that
sw∗F =
b2
3
and
∂sw∗F
∂aH
= 0.
The above results show that opening trade between a country where there
is a prevalence of state owned ﬁrms and another country with proﬁt seeking
ﬁrms generate eﬀects which may make trade beneﬁts quite asymmetric and
somewhat unpleasant, calling for some commercial policy. The main obstacle
to trade is the sort of foreclosure generated by a domestic pricing strategy
adopted by the state owned ﬁrm. As a result the domestic market turns out
to be almost (or at least hardly) uncontestable by foreign ﬁrms. The only
possibility to react to the barrier represented by foreclosure should be for a
domestic private ﬁrm accept a zero proft condition at home. We shall see
later in section 6 that some counteracting policy can be devised.
More catching results emerge if we extend the analysis to the intriguiging
case of increasing returns to scale we shall see in the next section.
3 Increasing returns to scale
Further interesting cases may be suggested by increasing returns technology.
The scenario is similar to the one of the section above. We consider again
two ﬁrms located in country F and H producing with concave costs due to a
ﬁxed commitment. We ﬁgure out a mode of behaviour similar to that of a
stateowned ﬁrm or to a (quasi) regulated ﬁrm. We should bear in mind that
regulation in several cases may lead to results similar to state ownership5.
Let us see why. Everytime we examine a ﬁrm with increasing returns to
scale (irs) we wonder what kind of pricing policy it may adopt. The theory
of contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) suggests a market
solution which is close to the planner objective, i.e., average cost pricing. A
ﬁrm enjoing irs should be either playing in a contestable environment, mostly
5See for instance Bauer (2005) and Decker (2014).
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when ﬁxed costs are not sunk, or be subject to some kind of regulation or
stateownership whenever ﬁxed costs are sunk. In all cases the ﬁrm may end
up with a zero proﬁt condition as the best strategy of conduct on the domestic
market where regulation is supposedly enforced. In this case the stateowned
ﬁrm and the corresponding proﬁt seeking ﬁrm behave in almost the same
way6. Trade may change and enrich the picture since it relaxes the domestic
market constraint when a ﬁrm sells abroad. As a matter of fact, there is
the possibility of making proﬁts in the foreign market where regulation is
absent or diﬀerent with respect to the domestic market. Regulation or simply
the public monitoring of the ﬁrm in the domestic market may add to the
rationale of adopting a policy of average cost pricing. If that is the case, in
the domestic market the ﬁrm covers the ﬁxed cost generating irs, while in
the foreign market it maximizes proﬁts without the ﬁxed cost burden. This
behaviour is replicated by the rival if the framework is symmetric. At the
end of the day we are left with two markets in which a domestic zero proﬁt
ﬁrm competes with a foreign proﬁt seeking ﬁrm. This way of modeling irs
and trade diﬀers from traditional models in the literature originated from
Helpman (1984) and Krugman (1980) where the strategies of ﬁrms are the
same regardless of the market where they operate. Before going through the
proposition describing the equilibrium setting, we have to describe the ﬁrms’
behaviour in a more detailed way. First each ﬁrm decides the quantity to
sell by setting proﬁts to zero on the domestic market. Therefore, the ﬁrm is
ready to sell at a price which is equal to the average cost. Then, each ﬁrm
observes the quantity of the rival on the relative market and sets the optimal
quantity to export by maximizing proﬁts abroad. Given this sequence of
interactions, the equilibrium setting can be described in the following:
Proposition 2 In a symmetric international duopoly with irs each ﬁrm charges
ﬁxed costs on the domestic sales making zero proﬁts at home while maximiz-
ing proﬁt in the foreign market. Prices are larger than average costs and
allow non negative proﬁts derived from exports. When markets diﬀer in size
the market price is higher in the larger market. This gives rise to a kind of
"involuntary dumping".
6See Bauer (2005) and Decker (2014).
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Proof. Let us consider separately domestic and export proﬁts, ﬁrst for the
domestic ﬁrm, secondly for the foreign ﬁrm:
πH = pHqH − f domestic (2)
πHX = tpF qHX foreign
πF = pFqF − f domestic
πFX = tpHqFX foreign
where f stands for ﬁxed cost. The ﬁrms simultaneously set the quantities
in their respective domestic markets by charging the ﬁxed cost on the do-
mestic balance sheet and setting domestic proﬁts equal to zero. Then, they
maximize proﬁts on the foreign market. The equilibrium quantities are:
q∗H =
1
4

a−
	
(a2 − 4f)2
a2
+
4f
a


; q∗HX =
b2 − 4f
2bt
; (3)
q∗F =
1
4

b−
	
(b2 − 4f)2
b2
+
4f
b


; q∗FX =
a2 − 4f
2at
(4)
Prices are:
p∗H =
1
4a

a+
	
(a2 − 4f)2
a2
+ 4f


; p∗F =
1
4b

b+
	
(b2 − 4f)2
b2
+ 4f


.
proﬁts are zero on the domestic market, i.e., π∗H = π
∗
F = 0, while abroad
they are:
π∗HX =
(b2 − 4f)

b

b+

(b2−4f)2
b2

+ 4f

8b2
and
π∗FX =
(a2 − 4f)

a

a+

(a2−4f)2
a2

+ 4f

8a2
.
Then, we can easily see that
∂p∗F
∂b
≥ 0 if b ≥ 2f
which is the condition to have nonnegative exports by H and, in a similar
vein, for the other ﬁrm. This conﬁrms the result of "involuntary dumping"
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whereby the larger country exports a good whose price abroad is lower than
at home. Moreover we can easily see that, with symmetric markets, the price
is equal to the average cost:
ACH =
f
q∗H + q
∗
HX
=
4abft
2a(b2 − 4f)− ab

(a2−4f)2
a2
t+ b(a2 + 4f)t
≤ p∗H
ACF =
f
q∗F + q
∗
FX
=
4abft
2b(a2 − 4f)− ab

(b2−4f)2
b2
t+ a(b2 + 4f)t
≤ p∗F .
If market F is strictly larger than H (b > a) the market price of F is higher
than that of H.
However, the proﬁt of the ﬁrm residing in the larger market is lower since
it exports less than the ﬁrm of the smaller market:
p∗H < p
∗
F ; q
∗
HX > q
∗
FX ; q
∗
H > q
∗
F ; π
∗
HX > π
∗
FX .
The outocome is interesting on several grounds. First of all it says that the
larger market displays higher prices. These prices are larger than marginal
costs and also average costs. The result of the above proposition may be used
to explain our funny "involuntary dumping". This kind of trade strategy
may be that adopted by some Chinese ﬁrms simply because of their size
and economies of scale. Notice that this eﬀect may become more severe
in the presence of excess capacity7. Nonetheless, all that may beneﬁt the
ﬁrm residing in the smaller market which will gain more from trade than
the rival from the large country. This replicates a recurrent trade result
maintaining that small countries beneﬁt more than large ones from free trade.
The resemblance of this outcome with a contestable market equilibrium may
let to infer that this equilibrium is somewhat desirable. As a matter of fact
it may be so. But in case of asymmetry in country size the smaller country
may be induced to introduce defensive policies against some kind of dumping
even though this sort of dumping is coupled to the opportunity to access
a larger market. Nonetheless, a contingent antidumping measure may be
devised to compensate for diﬀerences in average costs due to diﬀerent scales
of production. Again, if the market of the larger country is not protected
7This issue is developed in the companion paper (Rossini, 2016).
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by barriers, it provides opportunities for the ﬁrm of the smaller country that
ends up by making larger proﬁts from exports than the ﬁrm of the large
country selling in the small country.
4 Product diﬀerentiation and price competi-
tion
Now we go through the analysis of product diﬀerentiation and price compe-
tition and see how trade and asymmetric behaviour of ﬁrms lead to results
that parallel evidence on prices across countries and in particular China and
western countries. As before two ﬁrms based in country F and H respec-
tively produce a diﬀerentiated good that they export to each others’ market
by setting the price of their own good. The indirect demand functions are:
pH = a− qH − s t qFX
pF = b− qF − s t qHX
pHX = b− s qF − t qHX
pFX = a− s qH − t qFX
while the direct demand functions
qH =
pH + a(s− 1)− s pFX
s2 − 1
qF =
pF + b(s− 1)− s pHX
s2 − 1
qFX =
−s pH + a(s− 1) + pFX
t(s2 − 1)
qHX =
pHX + b(s− 1)− s pF
t(s2 − 1)
.
Proﬁt functions are
πH = pHqH − f ≥ 0 (5)
πF = pF qF − f ≥ 0
πHX = t pHXqHX ≥ 0
πFX = t pFXqFX ≥ 0.
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As we can see the ﬁxed cost is charged on the domestic proﬁt. We assume
that ﬁrms on their domestic markets simply break even. On the foreign
market they set their price maximizing proﬁts. Then the solution for the
equilibrium prices comes from the following ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs)
under the constraints (5) set above

∂πFX
∂pFX
∂πHX
∂pHX
πH
πF
= 0
The equilibrium prices are:
p∗HX = −
b(s− 1)((2 + s)s− 4) + s

b2(s+ s2 − 2)− 8f(2− 3s2 + s4)
4(s2 − 2)
p∗FX = −
a(s− 1)((2 + s)s− 4) + s

a2(s+ s2 − 2)− 8f(2− 3s2 + s4)
4(s2 − 2)
p∗H =
a(s+ s2 − 2)−

(s− 1)(a2(s− 1)(2 + s)2 − 8f(1 + s)(s2 − 2))
2(s2 − 2)
p∗F =
b(s+ s2 − 2)−

(s− 1)(b2(s− 1)(2 + s)2 − 8f(1 + s)(s2 − 2))
2(s2 − 2)
From the above results and ensuing proof we can establish the following:
Proposition 3 Firms face increasing returns to scale, adopt a Bertrand
mode of behaviour abroad, diﬀerentiate their products and decide to break
even on their domestic market where they charge the ﬁxed costs. Each ﬁrm
sells at a lower price a larger quantity on the foreign market giving rise,
again, to a reciprocal "involuntary" dumping partly similar to the original
Brander - Krugman type. If countries are not symmetric in terms of size the
ﬁrm of the larger country adopts a more aggressive dumping (lower price) in
the foreign country than its rival but sells less. The rival ﬁrm sells more in
the larger (foreign) country and makes higher proﬁts.
Proof. Just calculate the diﬀerence between the two prices made by the
two ﬁrms in their respective foreign markets:
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pF − pFX =
1
4(s2 − 2)
(a(s− 1)(s(s− 2)− 4) + 2b(s2 + s− 2) +
+s

(s− 1)(a2(s− 1)(2 + s)2 − 8f(1 + s)(s2 − 2))−
−2

(s− 1)(b2(s− 1)(2 + s)2 − 8f(1 + s)(s2 − 2))
which is always non negative. Some numerical simulations reported in Ap-
pendix A provide a description of the content of the above Proposition.
The above proposition somehow generalizes the previous results to a
Bertrand cum-diﬀerentiation scenario. Dumping now becomes more detailed.
It involves selling in the foreign market at a lower price in the presence of a
domestic ﬁrm which sets a higher price. This eﬀect may be exacerbated by
size asymmetries among countries.
5 Bertrand competition and foreclosure
Is there still a case for foreclosure with Bertrand competition? The question
matters since Bertrand competition is associated to large capacity that al-
lows ﬁrms to make real the "Bertrand threat" of driving prices down up to
marginal costs. This question is worth answering in times of overcapacity
due, for instance, to prolonged recessions or structural changes. In some in-
dustries we know that there is structural (or chronic) overcapacity making
Bertrand much more than a sheer academic toy. If we introduce diﬀerentia-
tion the marginal cost pricing equilibrium fades and we expect the Bertrand
threat not to lead to zero proﬁts since ﬁrms are shielded by their product
speciﬁcity. To investigate these issues, we consider a market in which a sta-
teowned ﬁrm operates (market H). Do we still have foreclosure? The answer
comes from the ensuing proposition where we examine the equilibrium in a
Bertrand setting of ﬁrms facing constant returns.
Proposition 4 With Bertrand competition, diﬀerentiation, a state owned
or any ﬁrm with the goal to break even on the domestic market, foreclosure
does not obtain (or, due to the large diﬀerence between the domestic and the
foreign price we may say that there is only "partial foreclosure"). The state
ﬁrm sells at home at a price lower than abroad, while the rival ﬁrm, which
maximizes proﬁts, adopts a dumping strategy
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Proof. Direct demand functions are
qH =
pH + a(s− 1)− spFX
s2 − 1
qFX =
spH − a(s− 1)− pFX
−t(s2 − 1)
qF =
pF + b(s− 1)− spHX
s2 − 1
qHX =
spF − b(s− 1)− pHX
−t(s2 − 1)
Let us deﬁne the proﬁt functions
πH = pHqH
πF = pF qF
πHX = tpHXqHX
πFX = tpFXqFX
and the optimal program is 
∂πF
∂pF
∂πFX
∂pFX
πH
∂πHX
∂pHX
= 0
As it can be seen the home ﬁrm has a zero proﬁt goal which corresponds to
the maximum consumer surplus from the domestic good in the presence of a
foreign ﬁrm supplying a diﬀerentiated good. Equilibrium variables are
q∗HX =
b
(2 + s− s2)t
; q∗F =
b
2 + s− s2
; q∗H =
a(2 + s)
2(1 + s)
; q∗FX =
a
27 + 2st
;
p∗H = 0; p
∗
FX =
1
2
a(1− s); p∗HX = b(1 +
1
s− 2
); p∗F = b(1 +
1
s− 2
);
π∗HX = −
b2(s− 1)
(s− 2)2(1 + s)
= π∗F ; π
∗
H = 0;π
∗
FX = −
a2(s− 1)
4(1 + s)
.
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Moreover:
p∗F − p
∗
FX = b(1 +
1
s− 2
) +
1
2
a(s− 1)  0 (6)
p∗H − p
∗
HX = −b(1 +
1
s− 2
) ≤ 0 (partial foreclosure)
q∗H − q
∗
HX =
2b+ a(s2 − 4)t
2(s− 2)(1 + s)t
q∗F − q
∗
FX = −
a(s− 2) + 2bt
2(s− 2)(1 + s)t
.
Here, we provide some simulation to support the above proposition:
Sim. I Sim. II
p∗F 1.67
p∗H 0
p∗FX 1.00 2.00
p∗HX 1.67
q∗HX 6.61
q∗FX 3.97 7.94
q∗H 7.78 15.56
q∗F 4.63
π∗HX 7.72
π∗H 0
π∗FX 2.78
π∗F 7.72
p∗F − p
∗
FX 0.67 -0.33
p∗H − p
∗
HX -1.67 -1.67
TABLE 1
Sim. I parameters: a = 10, b = 10, s = 0.8, t = 0.7
Sim. II parameters: a = 20, b = 10, s = 0.8, t = 0.7
As it can be seen from (6) complete foreclosure does not obtain, even
though we may have a kind of "partial" foreclosure, i.e., a domestic price
lower than the export price. This result diﬀers from Cournot, but still points
to a ﬁrm strategy which is the opposite of dumping and may be able to
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explain why we observe prices which are lower at home than on the export
market. Of course, this kind of "partial foreclosure" or reverse dumping is
quite remarkable and it may call for some trade policy. As for the issues
examined in previous sections the extent of country asymmetries may make
the outcomes harder to sustain. However, it is not always the case that the
damaged country is the small country.
6 What kind of trade policy?
As it happens frequently in the new theories of trade the policy prescriptions
vary quite a lot according to speciﬁc market structure and strategies adopted
by ﬁrms, for instance Cournot versus Bertrand, private vs. stateowned ﬁrms.
In the above sections we have seen a bunch of diﬀerent results. First, the
market price in the country with the stateowned ﬁrm is lower than in the
foreign country where the domestic ﬁrm sells maximizing proﬁt. Secondly,
the market of the stateowned ﬁrm is foreclosed (totally in the case of Cournot
and partially in the case of Bertrand) to the foreign ﬁrm. In a diﬀerent
scenario, with increasing returns to scale, examined only with a Cournot
mode of interaction, there is a size eﬀect whereby the larger country tends to
have higher prices and adopt dumping abroad. Clearly these diﬀerent results
exclude the possibility of featuring a unique "simple" dumping or foreclosure
case to be counteracted by a catchall sheer "antidumping" duty or anything
close to it. Nonetheless, we may try to devise speciﬁc commercial policies to
improve upon the welfare of the country which may be hurt by foreclosure or
by dumping, whatever their origin even if it is hard either for a regulator or
a trade policy maker to trace a market outcome to its strategic determinants
and design "proper" commercial policies.
Then, what kind of trade policy may be envisaged? Given the wide variety
of speciﬁc scenarios, it may seem that only a piecemeal approach is feasible.
Once again we must notice that the strategies we have seen above are carried
out by ﬁrms and are quite hard to single out and measure.
We proceed conﬁning our analysis of possible trade policies to the speciﬁc
case of foreclosure.
As seen above a foreign proﬁt seeking ﬁrm may be kept out of a country
where the incumbent ﬁrm is stateowned. In such a case the foreign country
may wish to help its ﬁrm to penetrate the market from which it is excluded.
19
What kind of rationale should inspire an action to promote the export by the
domestic ﬁrm? The policy may actually come from the consideration of a
broadly encompassing social welfare function that a government is supposed
to maximize. This goal may depart from traditional social welfare functions.
A government may simply want to provide its national ﬁrms a basic sup-
port to sell in all foreign markets. Why? The reason has at least a twin
ground. First, governments know that exporting is a healthy strategy since
it stimulates innovation and competitiveness with considerable feedback on
the entire national economy. Secondly, the foreign stateowned ﬁrm sells in
the market of the proﬁt seeking rival which may solicit the government to
guarantee reciprocity in terms of trade opportunities. Therefore, a trade
policy to counteract foreclosure should neither be dictated by mercantilism
nor by any general macroeconomic reason, nor related to usual social wel-
fare targets. It may simply be oriented to guarantee an eﬃciency boost for
exporting domestic ﬁrms and to obtain reciprocity standards.
On the basis of these considerations, we provide an example of a possible
policy out of the large cluster of measures that may be adopted.
In this sense we open the way to a fresh analyisis of counteracting trade
policy measures devised to reciprocity standards when foreign ﬁrms have
organization structures and market strategies that are deemed asymmetric
with respect to domestic ﬁrms.
Conﬁning to stateowned ﬁrms induced foreclosure, we can devise a simple
trade protection policy that allows a country to compensate the disadvantage
that emerges with respect to the foreign country that has the stateowned ﬁrm.
Perhaps, the simplest measure that could be set in place is a subsidy.
We summarize some of the features of this protective policy in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 5 A per unit of output production subsidy may be set by the
country home of the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. The goal of the goverment is
to let the proﬁt seeking ﬁrm be internationally as competitive as the state-
owned foreign ﬁrm and export the same quantity. In such a case the subsidy
increases with the size of the market and decreases as the foreign stateowned
ﬁrm costs increase.
Proof. We use a more general framework with respect to the model of
previous sections introducing heterogeneous costs across ﬁrms. Therefore,
while the demand functions remain the same, the proﬁt functions now look
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as follows:
πF = (pF − cF )qF + t(pH − cF )qFX
πH = (pH − cH)qH + t(pF − cH)qHX
where cF and cH are the average costs of production of the two ﬁrms F and
H. If ﬁrm F is a social welfare maximizer while ﬁrm H is a proﬁt seeker the
equilibrium quantities of the Cournot game are:
qH =
1
3
(a+ cF − 2cH)
qHX =
cF − cH
2t
qFX =
a− 2cF + cH
3t
qF = a− cF .
If cH ≥ cF exports of country H to F are negative. To make them non
negative we should provide ﬁrm H with a subsidy per unit of output τ as
follows:
τ ≥
cF − cH2t
 .
As it can be seen the subsidy depends directly on the gap between the costs of
the two rivals and the subsidy decreases as transport costs decrease (t→ 1).
If country H objective is to let the ﬁrm export the same amount of F the
subsidy may be found ﬁrst by equating qFX and qHX and solving in terms of
cH:
qFX = qHX if c
s
H =
1
5
(7cF − 2a) ≤ cF
where csH is the cost of H that makes for an export equal to that of F. There-
fore, if cH = cF , the subsidy that lets the proﬁt seeker export as much as the
stateowned ﬁrm must be equal to
cF − c
s
H = cF −
1
5
(7cF − 2a) =
2
5
(a− cF ).
Then the export subsidy for the H ﬁrm to export as much as the stateowned
ﬁrm should be
τEX =
2
5
a− cF .
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As it can be seen it should be calibrated to the size of the market (increase
as the size increases) and to the cost of the rival (if the rival becomes more
eﬃcient the subsidy for H must increase).
We may design subsidies or other trade policy tools bound to pursue
alternative public goals. In the above proposition we have just provided
one instance of a policy measure that could be adopted by a government of
a country whose proﬁt seeking ﬁrm is foreclosed abroad by a foreign state
owned ﬁrm. If the government wants the domestic ﬁrm to export as much as
the foreign rival it must subsidize the domestic proﬁt seeker with a per unit
production subsidy that is directly proportional to the size of the market and
inversely to the cost of the rival.
We have presented just an example of an (open) trade policy that is car-
ried out to counteract a foreign country (disguised) trade policy that gives
rise to domestic market foreclosure due to the presence of a stateowned ﬁrm.
Many other policy choices could be designed to counteract the trade advan-
tage that a stateowned ﬁrm shows as its domestic market may be somehow
protected. We leave an extensive analysis of this issue for a next paper.
7 Conclusions
Nowadays most trade policies are not easy to detect and are hardly mea-
surable. Many current international trade disputes are embedded in this
problem. Some issues gravitate around the role of ﬁrms which are partly or
entirely under public control. It seems that in certain cases, the trade poli-
cies that some countries (China, the US and the EU) are using are somehow
"delegated" to ﬁrms whose strategies and ownership structure are part of
the export promotion policies that countries adopt. Stateowned ﬁrms may
be one important vehicle of this endevour in countries with a strong presence
of the state in the economy such as China. Surprisingly enough, traits of the
Chinese economy are replicated in several market economies especially as
far as the use of stateowned companies (or quasi state owned) is concerned.
For instance in France the government has a controlling stake (some 20%)
in the car manufacture Renault-Nissan, while in Germany the giant Volk-
swagen is under the control of local states (Laender). In China state owned
ﬁrms which are strong exporters, cover a large chunk of the economy ranging
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from one fourth to one third (according to some oﬃcial data go beyond that
level). We have seen that there may be a tendency for state ﬁrms to make
the entrance in the domestic market by foreign ﬁrms hard. We termed this
strategy as one of (partial) foreclosure. This is a radical mode of behaviour
coming from a simple theoretical model which is not entirely general and
it is based on a Cournot mode of interaction in oligopoly. A less extreme
outcome emerges in a Bertrand framework where we end up with "partial
foreclosure", i.e., a market price lower at home than abroad. Anyway that
occurs when a state owned ﬁrm faces competition from a foreign proﬁt seek-
ing rival. This outcome is consistent with the anedctotal observation that for
some goods the domestic price is signiﬁcantly lower than the export price.
This is the opposite of dumping but it could be damaging as much or more
than sheer dumping, not in terms of traditional welfare criteria, but in terms
of asymmetric competition and market access.
A second related question touches economies of scale. Here the issue is
not strictly associated to state owned ﬁrms, yet to size of countries. We
have gone through increasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm level adopting the
solution criterion that each ﬁrm sets the price equal to average cost at home
charging the entire ﬁxed cost on the domestic balance sheet. The ﬁrm ex-
ports and maximizes proﬁts on the foreign market selling the quantity that
corresponds to the equalization of marginal revenue to marginal cost. This
behavioural assumption is not general but it may provide a good represen-
tation of reality. The result is traditional dumping since the export price set
by each ﬁrm is lower than the domestic price. This kind of dumping may be
made larger as the size of countries diﬀer. The ﬁrm from the larger country
sells abroad at a lower price. However, the larger market represents an op-
portunity for the ﬁrm of the smaller country which can compensate the small
size of the domestic market. This opportunity requires the large country to
be eﬀectively open. Otherwise, in the presence of increasing returns to scale
the large country may have an "exorbitant" competitive advantage.
On the basis of these conclusions proper trade policies could be based only
on a piecemeal approach suited to speciﬁc circumstances and ﬁrm strategies.
Sheer antidumping or compensative-safeguard measures may not be useful.
In the case of market foreclosure induced by a stateowned foreign rival a
subsidy can be designed to allow the domestic proﬁt seeking ﬁrm to export
to the foreign market as much as the foreign stateowned ﬁrm. This subsidy
could be result of a government wishing to guarantee reciprocity in terms
of market opportunities to its ﬁrms in a foreign market foreclosed by the
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presence of a state owned ﬁrm. That is just an example of a trade policy out
of many possible actions that may be undertaken by a government aiming to
provide industrial support to domestic ﬁrms on foreign markets where they
may suﬀer asymmetric treatments.
8 Appendix A
We provide some simulations in Table 1 of the content of Proposition.
Table 1
parameters 1st sim 2nd sim 3rd sim 4th sim 5th sim
a 10 20 20 20
b 10 =
f 2 =
s 0.8 = 0.5
t 0.7 = 0.5 0.7
..
Table 2
1st sim 2nd sim 3rd sim 4th sim
pHX 2.54 2.54 4.22
pFX 2.54 5.24 8.54
pH 3.84 8.10 14.16
pF 3.84 3.84 6.89
qHX 10.07 10.07 14.09 8.04
qFX 10.07 20.80 29.12 16.27
qF 0.52 0.52 0.29
qH 0.52 0.25 0.14
πFX 17.86 76.33 97.27
πHX 17.86 17.88 23.78
πF 0 0 0 0
πH 0 0 0 0
1st Sim: symmetry, zero proﬁt at home and ﬁxed cost charged at home,
Bertrand competition abroad. There is reciprocal dumping and sales are
higher on the export market than at home.
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2nd sim: asymmetry H market is larger (a=20) than F (b=10). Same
strategies as above.
9 Appendix B
Table B.1
Full Prices of Chinese manufacured goods in Europe and China (May
2016)
Huawei Mate 8 LG Hom Bot
8
Lenovo Yoga 700 (14") Wanli Tyres
9
China y 3699≃ 503E y 4498-5598≃ 612− 762E y 6999 ≃ 952E y 433≃ 59E
EU 502-583E 508E 799E 63E
Diﬀ.≃ 0 dumping dumping foreclosure
where y = yuan and E = Euro.
10 Appendix C
We prove in this appendix the remark concerning the foreclosure with a
diﬀerentiated Cournot framework. Demand functions, based on Singh and
Vives (1983) framework, are:
pH = a− qH − stqFX
pF = a− qF − stqHX
8Code VR 64701 LVMP . VR 6340LV = 4498 yuan, VR6270LVM = 5598 yuan,
VR6260LVM= 4998 yuan.
9Code 225/55R17 101 WZRXL
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while proﬁts are
πH = pHqH + tpF qHX
πF = pF qF + tpHqFX .
The consumer surplus in H is
CSH = (a− pH)(qH + tqFX)/2.
To get the equilibrium quantities we must solve the system

∂πF
∂qF
∂πF
∂qFX
∂(πH+CSH)
∂qH
∂πHX
∂qHX
= 0
The equilibrium variables are:
q∗HX =
a
3st
; q∗F =
a
3
; q∗H = a; q
∗
FX = 0; p
∗
H = 0; p
∗
F =
a
3
; π∗HX =
a2
9s
; π∗F =
a2
9
.
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